Our Work

The work, not the claims

Client work is always confidential, so the examples here use de-identified and sample data. Each one shows the kind of findings and recommendations a client receives. The full reports, with the analysis behind them, are available on request.

Clarity

Small business

The situation

A small primary production business with revenue of about $128,000, a large cash balance and almost no debt. The obvious question was whether to put that cash to work.

What it found

Sales fell 11.9% while operating costs rose by about $16,600. Operating profit fell 57%.

More than 90% of the year’s profit came from income outside the operation. The healthy-looking margin was not coming from the business itself.

The operation was running less than 5% above breakeven. A modest fall in sales would tip it into an operating loss.

The cash was real. The earnings it seemed to support were not.

The context

Workshopping the findings explained the fall in sales: several seasons of severe weather had cut yields. That changed the question from “what is wrong with the business?” to “how long can it carry the cost base until yields recover, and what should it do with the cash meanwhile?”

What it recommended

Hold the cash. Explain and repair the cost increase within 90 days. Identify the outside income. Expand only once the operation pays its own way.

Why it matters

A standard scorecard would have rated this business healthy. Looking at where the profit actually came from changed the answer.

Direction

Not-for-profit

The situation

A member-based not-for-profit with steady income and healthy reserves. The board felt secure. Members were getting the same services they had received years earlier, when the organisation had far less money.

What it found

Income and reserves had grown every year, while spending on member services stayed flat.

There was no agreed reserve floor, so every surplus was saved by default.

Reserves were held well beyond what the organisation’s real risks required, and were sitting idle rather than funding services.

The constraint on the organisation’s purpose was not funding. It was how the funding was being used.

What it recommended

Set a reserve policy with a floor based on the organisation’s real risks. Commit funds above the floor to member services through a multi-year plan.

Why it matters

By the usual measures the organisation looked strong. Measured against its purpose, it was under-investing in the members it exists to serve.

Group

Large multi-division group

The situation

A group of three divisions (distribution, manufacturing and services) had grown revenue every year for eight years, from $67.6 million to $96.7 million. The board saw growth. The diagnostic looked underneath it.

What it found

The distribution division had gone from a $1.23 million operating profit to a $1.19 million operating loss. Its gross margin fell from 22.4% to 17.1% while sales grew. It was selling more and earning less on every sale.

That division was funded by the other two. Its short-term borrowings rose from nil to $12.6 million, while manufacturing paid $3.0 million a year in dividends to the group.

Manufacturing, the group’s best performer, was running its plant down. Utilisation reached 94% while capital spending ran at 41% of depreciation.

The group was paying dividends it had not earned. Dividends were 125% of profit, funded by debt.

What the board was asked to decide

A 12-month turnaround test for the distribution division, with a restructure or exit decision at the end. A dividend reset to what the business actually generates. A plant reinvestment plan before capacity ran out.

Decision & Scenario Analysis

The decision, tested

The board then had three options for the distribution division: fix it, sell it or wind it down. Each was tested against doing nothing, over five years.

Selling ranked first, worth about $14 million more than doing nothing. It raises a price and stops a cash drain.

Winding down ranked second, at about $11 million.

The turnaround ranked third, at about $5 million. It improved the numbers, but the division could not fund it from its own cash. The group would have to.

One assumption decided the ranking: the sale price. Below about $5.5 million, winding down was worth more than selling.